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INTRODUCTION 
 
To determine the cognizability of a purported social group for 
asylum relief, all circuits
1
 consider the framework set out by the Board 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.
 
1 
By circuit: See, e.g., Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993); 
Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds sub 
nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004), reh’g granted 
en banc, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 29561 (4th Cir. Jan. 13, 2005); Ontunez-Tursios v. 
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2002); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 
533, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2003), modified on other grounds, Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 
453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2006); Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998); 
Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Montiel, 
225 F.3d 1084, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part, in part, on other grounds, 
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, 
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1198-
99 (10th Cir. 2005); Castillo-Arias v. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 
2006).   
1
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of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of Acosta.2 There, the BIA 
stated that the asylum applicant may establish membership in a 
particular social group if the applicant “is a member of a group of 
persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”3 An 
immutable characteristic is either unchangeable or so fundamental to 
one’s identity or conscience such that the person should not be 
required to change.
4
 That immutable characteristic “might be an innate 
one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it 
might be a shared past experience.”5 Despite the BIA’s inclusion of 
“sex”6 as an immutable characteristic, few circuits have recognized the 
possibility of a cognizable social group based on gender
7
 alone, 
specifically, a social group of women.
8
 But, a number of circuits have 
                                                 
2 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, on 
other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
3 
Id. at 233.
   
4 
Id.
   
5 
Id. (emphasis added).
   
6 
Sex refers to “the male or female division of a species, especially as 
differentiated with reference to the reproductive functions.” SEX DEFINITION, 
DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sex (last visited Dec. 11, 
2013).  Gender refers to “[s]exual identity, especially in relation to society or 
culture.” GENDER DEFINITION, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/gender (last visited Dec. 11, 2013). This 
Comment uses the terms interchangeably, and specifically refers to the state of being 
female.
  
7 
Even if gender can be changed, it is still immutable under Acosta because 
gender “is a characteristic so fundamental to identity that no one should have to 
change it.” Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of “Social Visibility” in 
Defining a “Particular Social Group” and Its Potential Impact on Asylum Claims 
Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 47, 88 (2008).  
8 
See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(acknowledging that females might constitute a particular social group in some 
circumstances and that Acosta “listed gender as an example of a prototypical 
immutable characteristic that could form the basis for a social group”); Fatin v. INS, 
12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting Acosta “specifically mentioned sex as an 
innate characteristic that could link the members of the particular social group[,] 
[t]hus to the extent that [Fatin] suggests that she would be persecuted or has a well-
founded fear that she would be persecuted . . . simply because she is a woman, she 
2
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recognized social groups defined by gender and one or more 
characteristics.
9
  
In Cece v. Holder, the en banc Seventh Circuit recognized that the 
formulation of “gender plus one or more narrowing characteristics” is 
a legitimate method to form a cognizable social group.
10
 Other circuits 
and the BIA have found cognizable gender plus social groups, with the 
plus being characteristics making the asylum applicant particularly 
vulnerable to persecution, such as “nationality, ethnicity, tribal 
affiliation, age, religion, marital or relationship/status, family 
membership (“kinship ties”), education level, absence of male 
protection, opposition to abuse, or transgression of social/cultural 
norms.”11 The gender plus approach is supported domestically and 
internationally.
12
 
                                                                                                                   
has identified a cognizable social group.”); but see Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 
(2d Cir. 1991) (stating that “[p]ossession of a broadly-based characteristics such as 
youth and gender will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a 
particular social group.”).
   
9 
See, e.g., Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding 
“women in Guatemala” could be a cognizable social group); Gomez-Zuluaga v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 345 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding “women who have 
escaped involuntary servitude after being abducted and confined by the FARC” were 
a cognizable social group); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding female tribal members constituted a cognizable social group); Fatin, 12 
F.3d at 1241 (concluding Iranian women refusing to conform to gender-specific laws 
and social norms were a cognizable social group).
   
10 
Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 676 (7th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Cece II] (en 
banc).
   
11 
Natalie Nanasi, Lessons from Matter of A-T-: Guidance for Practitioners 
Litigating Asylum Cases Involving a Spectrum of Gender-Based Harms, From 
Female Genital Mutilation to Forced Marriage and Beyond, 12-02 IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS 1 (Feb. 2012).
   
12 
See Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, Considerations for Asylum Officers 
Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, (May 26, 1995), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/65633.htm.; U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines 
on International Protection: “Membership of a Particular Social Group” Within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees. P 12, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3d36f23f4.html. 
3
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Historically, women pursuing gender-based asylum claims have 
faced significant barriers for three main reasons: (1) the harms women 
experienced were not considered persecution because their culture or 
religion either condoned or required the harms, the harms 
disproportionately affected women, or the harms were different than 
those experienced by men in similar circumstances; (2) non-State 
actors, like relatives or members of the community perpetrated the 
harms; and (3) women are often persecuted on account of gender, 
which is not one of the five protected grounds.
13
 Even though women 
and children are significantly overrepresented in the world’s refugee 
population,
14
 the difficulty women face fitting into one of the 
protected grounds causes them to constitute the minority of successful 
asylum claims.
15
  
The Acosta decision showed promise of expanding the definition 
of social group to include gender as a cognizable social group – a 
promise that asylum jurisprudence has largely not realized.
16
 No 
consensus exists among courts regarding the use of gender in defining 
a social group.
17
 The BIA and circuits are reluctant to accept gender as 
the basis of the social group formulation absent another qualifying 
                                                 
13 
Karen Musalo, Beyond Belonging: Challenging the Boundaries of 
Nationality: Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum Claims: A 
Unifying Rational for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 777, 781-82 
(2003). Also, the anti-immigrant climate of U.S. immigration policy over the last 
century partly explains resistance to gender-based asylum claims. Karen Musalo, 
Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to 
(Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119, 130-31 (2007) [hereinafter 
Protecting Victims].
   
14 
Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against 
Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum 
Claims Based on Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 281, 286 (2002).
   
15 
Elizabeth A. Hueben, Domestic Violence and Asylum Law: The United 
States Takes Several Remedial Steps in Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution, 70 
UMKC L. REV. 453, 453 (2001).
   
16 
Randall, supra note 14, at 294.
   
17 
Lisa C. Chan, Everything in Moderation: Why Any Gender Nexus under U.S. 
Asylum Law Must be Strictly Limited in Scope, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 169, 188 (2011). 
4
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characteristic.
18
 This reluctance to accept gender-based social groups 
is due to the concern that “half a nation’s residents [can] obtain asylum 
on the ground that women are persecuted there.”19 Accordingly, courts 
have narrowly construed social group formulations to control refugee 
numbers.
20
 But, “the size and breadth of a group alone does not 
preclude a group from qualifying as a social group.”21 
Narrow construction of the social group ground, the most widely 
used and applicable ground for gender-based asylum claims, has left 
women unable to utilize social groups defined in whole or in part by 
gender.
22
 This has led to an under-inclusive effect in granting asylum 
to women.
23
 Even when a gender-based social group is found 
cognizable, it is based on convoluted logic.
24
 The protected grounds of 
race, religion, and nationality are broadly defined; therefore, the social 
group ground should similarly be broadly defined.
25
  
                                                 
18 
Jesse Imbriano, Opening the Floodgates or Filling the Gap?: Perdomo v. 
Holder Advances the Ninth Circuit One Step Closer to Recognizing Gender-Based 
Asylum Claims, 56 VILL. L. REV. 327, 330 (2011). 
19 
Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005). Annually, the 
President of the United States, consulting with Congress, establishes an overall 
ceiling for refugee admissions and regional allocations before the beginning of the 
fiscal year. Daniel C. Martin & James E. Yankay, Refugees and Asylees: 2012, 
Office Immigr. Stat., DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Apr. 2013), at 2. For 
example, the overall ceiling for refugee admissions was 76,000 in 2012. Id.  
20 
Stephanie Kaye Bell, Adjudication of Gender Persecution Cases Under the 
Canada Guidelines: The United States Has No Reason to Fear an Onslaught of 
Asylum Claims, 20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMP. REG. 655, 659 (1995). 
21 
Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010); see Cece II, 733 F.3d 
662, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“The breadth of the social group says nothing 
about the requirements for asylum.”). 
22 
Stacey Kounelias, Asylum Law and Female Genital Mutilation: 
“Membership in a Particular Social Group:” Inadequately Protecting Persecuted 
Women, 11 SCHOLAR 577, 597 (2009).   
23 
Aimee Heitz, Providing a Pathway to Asylum: Re-interpreting “Social 
Group to Include Gender, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 215 (2013). 
24 
Randall, supra note 14, at 294.
 
25 
Imbriano, supra note 18, at 353.
 
5
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Narrow construction of gender-based social groups requires 
female applicants to narrowly define their social group, making the 
social group ground unlike the other protected grounds.
26
 Even though 
the social group ground was intended to provide asylum relief to those 
who did not fit into the other protected grounds, the ground has always 
been narrowly construed.
27
 Acosta strikes a balance between 
expanding the social group ground beyond relief provided by the other 
four protected grounds and applying the ground so broadly that the 
requirement becomes inconsequential.
28
  
The BIA should return to its conclusion in Acosta that gender is 
an immutable characteristic defining a social group.
29
 The BIA and 
circuits require the plus characteristics to also be immutable for gender 
plus social groups. In Cece v. Holder, the court held Cece was a 
member of a cognizable social group “united by the common and 
immutable characteristic [sic] of being (1) young, (2) Albanian, (3) 
women, (4) living alone.”30 Because the BIA already held gender is an 
immutable characteristic,
31
 applicants should not be required to prove 
the plus characteristics are immutable as well. Gender alone should be 
the immutable characteristic, and the issue should be whether the plus 
characteristics narrow the group sufficiently so that group members 
can establish the nexus between group membership and persecution.
32
 
Part I of this Comment explains the requirements of establishing 
asylum eligibility. Part II discusses establishing the protected ground 
                                                 
26 
Id. 
27 
Heitz, supra note 23, at 215.
 
28 
Imbriano, supra note 18, at 345. 
29 
Id. at 359. 
30 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
31 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, 
on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
32 
See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender constitutes 
a social group (which both certainly do) but on whether the members of that group 
are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted ‘on 
account of’ their membership.”); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2006), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) (same). 
6
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of membership in a particular social group. Part III summarizes the 
background, panel opinion, and en banc opinion of Cece v. Holder. 
Part IV addresses the circuit split created by Cece v. Holder. Part V 
outlines representative cases where gender plus social groups were 
found cognizable and analogizes the cases’ facts and reasoning to Cece 
v. Holder. Part VI, inter alia, proposes a judicial interpretation of 
gender-based social group formulations that will assist in creating 
uniformity of interpreting the cognizability of gender-based social 
groups and increasing protection for persecuted women.   
   
I. ESTABLISHING REFUGEE STATUS 
 
An alien must establish she is a refugee within the meaning of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act
33
 to obtain asylum, meaning she is 
unable or unwilling to return to her country due to past persecution or 
a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.
34
 Congress did not define persecution. Thus, the BIA and the 
circuits define persecution on a case by case basis.
35
  
The BIA defines persecution broadly as “the infliction of suffering 
or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way 
regarded as offensive (e.g., race, religion, political opinion, etc.), in a 
manner condemned by civilized governments.”36 Most circuits broadly 
define persecution as well.
37
 The Seventh Circuit listed actions that 
                                                 
33 
8 U.S.C § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
 
34 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
   
35 
See Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir. 2005).
   
36 
Matter of Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 456-57, rev’d on other grounds, 
750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985).  
37 
By circuit: Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(“[P]ersecution encompasses more than threats to life or freedom . . . but less than 
mere harassment or annoyance.”) (citations omitted); Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[P]ersecution is the infliction of suffering 
or harm upon those who differ on the basis of a protected statutory ground.”) 
(citation omitted); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (“‘[P]ersecution’ 
[includes] threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe 
7
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constitute past persecution, including “detention, arrest, interrogation, 
prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of property, 
surveillance, beatings, or torture.”38 Establishing past persecution 
creates the rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future 
persecution,
39
 which the government can rebut by showing changed 
conditions in the alien’s home country such that the alien no longer has 
a well-founded fear
40
 or that internal relocation is reasonable.
41
 
Absent past persecution, asylum may be granted if the alien 
demonstrates a well-founded fear of persecution.
42
 The alien must 
show her fear of persecution is “subjectively genuine and objectively 
reasonable.”43 The United States Supreme Court stated that a “well-
                                                                                                                   
that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.”); Abdel-Masieh v. U.S. INS, 73 F.3d 
579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[P]ersecution . . . is . . . ‘the infliction of suffering or 
harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as 
offensive . . . in a manner condemned by civil governments.”) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); De Souza v. INS, 999 F.2d 1156, 1158 (7th Cir. 
1993) (“‘[P]ersecution’ . . . [is] punishment or . . . infliction of harm for political, 
religious, or other reasons that [the U.S.] does not recognize as legitimate.”) (citation 
omitted); Regalado-Garcia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Persecution 
is the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”) (citation omitted); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1171 
(9th Cir. 2005) (“Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who 
differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive.”) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chaib v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 
1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Persecution is the infliction of suffering or harm upon 
those who differ . . . in a way regarded as offensive and requires more than just 
restrictions or threats to life and liberty.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
38 
Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
     
39 
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). 
40 
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
 
41 
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(B).
   
42 
8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b).
   
43 
Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001); see Diaz-
Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The objective component 
ensures that the alien's subjective fear is ‘well-founded’ in fact and not in fantasy . . . 
What is critical is that the alien prove his fear is subjectively genuine and objectively 
reasonable.”) (citation omitted).   
8
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founded” fear of an event occurring does not mean it must be “more 
likely than not” an event will occur.44 To satisfy the objective well-
founded fear requirement, the alien must demonstrate she will be 
singled out for persecution.
45
 Alternatively, the alien can show those 
similarly situated to her are targeted for persecution by establishing 
that: (1) in her home country, there is a pattern or practice of 
persecuting persons similarly situated to the applicant on account of 
one of the protected grounds; and (2) she is in one of those groups, and 
thus her fear is reasonable.
46
  
Finally, the alien must show a nexus between one of the five 
protected grounds and the past persecution or fear of future 
persecution, meaning the past persecution or fear of future persecution 
is “on account of” a protected ground.47 “On account of” means the 
protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the 
persecution.
48
 The alien must also establish that her persecutor is 
aware or could become aware of her association to the protected 
                                                 
44 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987) (“One can certainly have 
a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of 
the occurrence taking place.”).   
45 
Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1994); see 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(b)(2).   
46 
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
   
47 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 
2011) (citation omitted). Establishing a nexus is a two-step analysis that requires 
identifying the relevant protected ground, then establishing the causal connection 
between that ground and persecution. Meghan Casey, Refugee Women as Cultural 
Others: Constructing Social Group and Nexus for FGM, Sex Trafficking, and 
Domestic Violence Asylum Claims in the United States, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. 
JUST. 981, 1006 (2012).
   
48 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Previously, courts used a mixed motive 
analysis, where the persecutor must be motivated “at least in part” by a protected 
ground. See, e.g., Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2003); Girma v. 
INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 
735-36 (9th Cir. 1999), superseded by statute, REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (2005), as recognized in, Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 
F.3d 734, 739-740 (9th Cir. 2009).
   
9
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ground.
49
 Finally, the alien must be found credible.
50
 If granted 
asylum, the alien may remain indefinitely in the U.S.
51
     
 
II. FORMULATING A COGNIZABLE SOCIAL GROUP52 
 
To establish refugee status based on social group membership, the 
alien must: "(1) identify a particular social group; (2) establish that 
[s]he is a member of that group; and (3) establish that [her] past 
persecution or well-founded fear of persecution is based on [her] 
membership in that group."
53
 The BIA first defined a social group in 
Matter of Acosta. There, the BIA stated a social group is a group 
whose members "share a common, immutable characteristic."
54
 An 
immutable characteristic is a characteristic that is either "beyond the 
power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual 
identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed."
55
 
All circuits currently rely on the Acosta analysis.
56
 Further, the 
purported social group must be defined with particularity.
57
 
                                                 
49 
Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 446 (B.I.A. 1987).
   
50 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
   
51 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A). The right to remain in the U.S. may be revoked 
under certain circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2).
   
52 
This Comment only addresses gender and the protected ground of 
membership in a particular social group.  But, refugee status can be based on one 
ground or a combination of grounds.  See Osorio v. INS., 18 F.3d 1017, 1027 (2d 
Cir. 1994). Also, a gender-based asylum claim may fall under protected grounds 
other than membership in a particular social group. Chan, supra note 17, at 185. This 
Comment does not address asylum claims based on race, nationality, religion, or 
political opinion. Further, this Comment does not address other requirements to 
qualify as a refugee, including demonstrating past persecution or a well-founded fear 
of persecution based on a protected ground and being credible.   
53 
Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
   
54 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, 
on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). 
55 
Id. at 233-34.
   
56 
See cases cited supra note 1.
   
57 
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[T]he key 
question is whether the proposed description is sufficiently particular, or is too 
10
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Shortly after Acosta was decided, the Ninth Circuit declined to 
follow the Acosta definition and instead defined a social group as "a 
collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are 
actuated by some common impulse or interest."
58
 To meet that 
definition, a current or former voluntary association of the group’s 
members must exist imparting "some common characteristic that is 
fundamental to their identity as a member of that . . . group."
59
 The 
Ninth Circuit later changed its social group definition to encompass 
Acosta's immutability requirement by stating that the group members 
must be united by a current or former voluntary association or an 
innate characteristic that is so fundamental to its members’ identities 
or consciences that they cannot or should not be required to change 
it.
60
  
The Second Circuit added a visibility requirement to the Acosta 
definition, meaning the social group members must share an 
immutable or fundamental characteristic making them identifiable to 
potential persecutors.
61
 Because the social group definitions in some 
circuits differed from the Acosta definition, the BIA clarified the 
definition in Matter of C-A- by reaffirming the Acosta definition, 
rejecting the Ninth Circuit's voluntary associational relationship 
definition, and approving the Second Circuit's visibility requirement.
62
 
The BIA termed the Second Circuit's visibility definition “social 
visibility” and added it as a relevant factor in the social group 
analysis.
63
 Later, the BIA added social visibility as a requirement to 
                                                                                                                   
amorphous to create a benchmark for determining group membership.”) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
 
58 
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
   
59 
Id.
 
60 
Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000), 
overruled in part, in part, on other grounds, Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 
(9th Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006). 
61 
Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds 
sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007). 
62 
Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 955-57 (B.I.A. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 
Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006).
   
63 
Id. at 959-61.
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form a cognizable social group.
64
 Most circuits accepted the BIA's 
inclusion of social visibility as a requirement to establish membership 
in a particular social group.
65
 Social visibility is broadly defined as 
requiring that "the relevant trait be potentially identifiable by members 
of the community, either because it is evident or because the 
information defining the characteristic is publicly accessible.”66 The 
Third Circuit and Seventh Circuit rejected the social visibility 
requirement as inconsistent with past BIA decisions.
67
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 
Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73-74 (B.I.A. 2007) 
(concluding “wealthy Guatemalans” were not a cognizable social group because the 
group lacked social visibility). The social visibility requirement may inhibit a female 
applicant’s ability to present a cognizable social group because “one tactic of 
persecution is to force a subjugated group [like women] to remain invisible.” Marisa 
Silenzi Cianciarulo & Claudia David, Pulling the Trigger: Separation Violence as a 
Basis for Refugee Protection for Battered Women, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 337, 370 
(2009). 
65 
By circuit: Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2009); Ucelo-
Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Al-Ghorbani v. 
Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 994 (6th Cir. 2009); Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 
628–29 (8th Cir. 2008); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 858–62 (9th Cir. 
2009); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 648 (10th Cir. 2012); Castillo-
Arias, 446 F.3d at 1197–98. 
66 
Rivera-Barrientos, 666 F.3d at 652. The BIA has not adequately defined 
social visibility, which has led to disparity and an unlimited amount of discretion in 
its definition. Heitz, supra note 23, at 235.
      
67 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(stating the social visibility requirement “is an unreasonable addition to the 
requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution 
on account of membership in a particular social group”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.2d 
611, 615-16 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting the inconsistency of the BIA’s use of the social 
visibility requirement and citing cases where the BIA found a cognizable social 
group absent referencing the group’s social visibility).
   
12
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III. CECE V. HOLDER 
 
A. Background 
 
Johanna Cece (“Cece”), an Albanian citizen, entered the U.S. as a 
twenty three year old in 2002.
68
 She used a fraudulent Italian passport 
to enter the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program.
69
 Within a year of 
her entry, she applied for asylum and withholding of removal.
70
 In 
addition to her fear of persecution based on her religion (as an 
Orthodox Christian) and her political opinion (supporting the 
Democratic party), she also feared persecution as a young woman 
living alone at risk of being kidnapped and forced into prostitution.
71
 
The last mentioned fear of persecution has fueled the contention 
among various appellate levels regarding the formulation of a 
cognizable social group.   
After Cece’s parents left Albania in 2001, Cece lived alone in the 
city of Korçë.
72
 In 2001, a gang leader named Reqi began harassing 
Cece by asking her out on dates, offering her rides, and stalking her 
throughout Korçë.
73
 Reqi’s gang was known for forcing women into 
prostitution rings, trafficking drugs, and murdering other gang 
members.
74
 Cece ignored Reqi’s advances.75 On June 4, 2001, Reqi 
                                                 
68 
Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733 
F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
   
69 
Id. Italy is a participant of the Visa Waiver Program; Albania is not. See 8 
C.F.R § 217.2(a). 
70 
Id. at 512. An alien must apply for asylum within one year of her last arrival 
in the U.S. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). A late filing is excused if the alien 
demonstrates changed circumstances materially affecting asylum eligibility or 
extraordinary circumstances directly related to her failure to apply within one year. 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2012). To qualify for withholding of removal, the alien 
must meet a higher burden of proof – that it is more likely than not that the alien 
would be persecuted on account of one of the five protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 
1231. 
71 
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
   
72 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 666.
   
73
 Id.
  
74
 Id.
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followed Cece into a cosmetics store and pinned her against a wall, 
refusing to let her go.
76
 Reqi questioned why she would not go out 
with him, making it clear “he could not be stopped and that he would 
find her and do whatever he wanted to her.”77 None of the customers 
aided Cece.
78
 
Cece reported the incident to the police, who claimed she lacked 
proof and took no action.
79
 Several days later, someone threw a rock 
through Cece’s window.80 For her safety, Cece moved 120 miles north 
to the city of Tirana where her sister lived in a university dormitory.
81
 
Her sister left Albania the following year.
82
 Cece then left Albania 
because as a young woman living alone, Cece feared she was a target 
for kidnapping and forced prostitution.
83
 
Dr. Bernd Fischer, an expert on Albania and Professor in Balkan 
History, testified on Cece’s behalf at her hearing before the 
immigration judge.
84
 Dr. Fischer explained the grave problem of 
human trafficking for prostitution by Albanian gangs who are often 
protected by the police.
85
 The 2004 U.S. Department of State reports 
                                                                                                                   
75 
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
   
76 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 666-67.
   
77 
Id. at 667.
 
78 
Id.
   
79 
Id.
     
80 
Id.
   
81 
Id.
     
82 
Id.
   
83 
Id.
  
84 
Id.
   
85 
Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733 F.3d 
662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); see Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (noting the immigration 
judge’s conclusions that “Albania stands out in Europe as a major country of origin 
of traffickers in prostitution; the government’s judicial system is not effective against 
the problem; Albania suffers from a major and ongoing trafficking of young women 
by gangs; and there is no prospect in the foreseeable future of the government being 
able or willing to address the problem.”).   
14
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corroborated his testimony.
86
 Dr. Fischer explained that gangs target 
women between the ages of sixteen and twenty six, but force many 
women outside that age range into prostitution as well.
87
 A single 
woman living alone, he testified, is particularly vulnerable to 
trafficking, especially if previously pursued by a gang member.
88
 He 
emphasized the Albanian government could not protect women from 
forced prostitution because law enforcement often either protects or 
assists the gangs.
89
 The prevalence of trafficking nationwide prevented 
Cece from relocating safely within Albania, Dr. Fischer asserted.
90
   
In 2006, the immigration judge granted Cece asylum, concluding 
she belonged to the social group of “young women who are targeted 
for prostitution by traffickers in Albania.”91 On appeal, the BIA 
vacated the immigration judge’s decision, concluding (1) Cece did not 
establish past persecution; (2) Cece relocated successfully within 
Albania; and (3) Cece did not identify a cognizable social group.
92
 
Specifically, Cece’s social group failed because the group members 
lacked social visibility and “a narrowing characteristic other than the 
risk of being persecuted.”93 On remand, the immigration judge 
deferred to the BIA’s conclusion that Cece was not a member of a 
cognizable social group.
94
 The immigration judge reluctantly accepted 
the BIA’s finding that Cece could successfully relocate within 
                                                 
86 
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512. Courts generally regard State Department reports as 
reliable. El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 204 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted). 
87
 Cece II, 733 F. 3d at 667.  Cece was twenty three years old when she entered 
the U.S. in 2002. Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512. As such, when the immigration judge 
granted her asylum in 2006, she was either twenty six or twenty seven years old. 
Cece II, 733 F. 3d at 667. 
88 
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
   
89 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667.
    
90 
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 512.
   
91 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667.
 
92 
Id. at 668.
 
93 
Id.
    
94 
Id.
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Albania.
95
 The BIA dismissed Cece’s second appeal by emphasizing 
Cece’s purported social group “was defined in large part by the harm 
inflicted on its members and did not exist independently of the 
traffickers.”96 The BIA noted again that internal relocation was 
reasonable.
97
 Cece then appealed to the Seventh Circuit.
98
     
  
B. The Panel Opinion 
 
In an opinion authored by Judge Daniel Manion and joined by 
Judge Frank Easterbrook, the panel denied Cece’s petition for review, 
affirming the BIA’s findings that Cece was not a member of a 
cognizable social group and Cece could relocate safely within 
Albania.
99
 The panel stated that members of a social group “must 
share a common immutable or fundamental characteristic beyond the 
risk, past or present, of harm.”100 On appeal, Cece argued the BIA 
erred by concluding members of the purported social group were 
united only by persecution suffered in the past; Cece argued the 
members of the proposed group were united by a present risk of 
persecution.
101
 The panel stated the members of Cece’s purported 
social group had “little or nothing in common beyond being 
targets.”102 Further, Cece failed to establish asylum eligibility because 
of (1) her fraudulent entry into the U.S.; (2) her failure to demonstrate 
she would be singled out for persecution; and (3) her failure to 
demonstrate she could not relocate within Albania.
103
     
                                                 
95 
Id.
  
96 
Id.
  
97 
Id.
    
98 
Id. An asylum applicant seeks review of a BIA decision by the circuit with 
jurisdiction over the geographical area where the immigration judge completed 
proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
   
99 
Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 511-14 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733 
F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
100 
Id. at 513 (emphasis in original).
   
101 
Id.
  
102 
Id. (quoting Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009)).
 
103 
Id. at 513-14. 
16
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Judge Ilana Rovner
104
 dissented, disagreeing with the panel’s 
conclusion that the purported social group was defined solely by harm 
suffered by its members.
105
 Another characteristic besides being 
targets united the purported social group, specifically, “the common 
and immutable characteristic of being women between the ages of 
sixteen and twenty-seven who meet the profile of traffickers.”106 To 
illustrate, Judge Rovner listed cases finding a cognizable social group 
even though the members shared the characteristic of being targets of 
persecution.
107
 Accordingly, using persecution as one characteristic in 
a social group definition does not foreclose finding a cognizable social 
group.
108
 Judge Rovner noted the uniqueness of Albania and the 
problem of sex trafficking due to the country’s economic, political, 
and legal instability.
109
  
Despite the prevalence of trafficking, however, Judge Rovner 
explained a generalized fear would not be a viable asylum claim.
110
 
Cece was special: (1) she lived alone in a country where women do 
not commonly live alone; (2) Cece was in the target age group of 
women most at risk for forced prostitution; and (3) a gang leader 
targeted her already and the police refused to help.
111
 Judge Rovner 
would have remanded to the immigration judge regarding two asylum 
eligibility issues: (1) Cece was no longer within her expert’s target age 
group of women at risk for forced prostitution, and (2) Judge Rovner 
and the immigration judge expressed doubt regarding the BIA’s 
conclusion that Cece could relocate safely considering the BIA failed 
to recognize that Cece lived with her sister when she relocated 
                                                 
104 
Judge Rovner and her parents fled Latvia before the Nazi occupation. 
William Hageman, Remarkable Woman: Ilana Rovner, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2011, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-11-25/features/ct-tribu-remarkable-rovner-
20111125_1_latvia-nazis-ship. 
105 
Cece I, 668 F.3d at 514 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
 
106 
Id.
 
107 
Id. at 514-15.
 
108 
See id.
   
109 
Id. at 515.
 
110 
Id.
 
111 
Id.
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successfully within Albania.
112
 Cece filed a petition for rehearing en 
banc; the Seventh Circuit granted her petition and vacated the panel’s 
opinion.
113
         
 
C. En Banc Opinion 
 
1. Majority Opinion 
 
The remaining Seventh Circuit judges agreed with Judge Rovner, 
with Judge Rovner writing the en banc opinion and Judge Manion and 
Judge Easterbrook writing dissenting opinions.
114
 The court held Cece 
was a member of a cognizable social group “united by the common 
and immutable characteristic [sic] of being (1) young, (2) Albanian, 
(3) women, (4) living alone.”115 The age, gender, nationality, or living 
situation of the group members’ are not alterable.116 To begin, the 
court discussed defining a social group.
117
 The Seventh Circuit follows 
the Acosta social group definition 
118
: membership in a particular 
social group is defined by “a characteristic that is either immutable or 
is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that a person 
ought not be required to be changed.”119  
The court found that Cece and the immigration judge articulated 
the relevant social group.
120
 Nonetheless, the court noted that the 
                                                 
112 
Id.
 
113 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013).
   
114 
Id.
   
115 
Id. at 672.   
116 
Id. at 673. 
117 
Id. at 669-71.
   
118 
Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998).   
119 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 669 (quoting Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 
233-34 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)). 
120 
Id. at 670. Per Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam) and 
INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam), “[a]n appellate court errs 
by deciding in the first instance, without giving the [BIA] the first opportunity on 
remand, whether a proposed social group is cognizable.” Id. at 677. In his dissent, 
18
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immigration judge omitted the crucial characteristic of living alone as 
part the relevant social group.
121
 Cece’s asylum application asserted 
she was the “perfect target” because she was young and living alone, 
Cece’s testimony emphasized that it is uncommon for women to live 
alone in Albania and she was afraid to do so, and the expert’s 
testimony addressed the risk of women living alone in Albania.
122
 
Accordingly, the court declared the immigration judge’s definitions of 
Cece’s social group (first as “young women who are targeted for 
prostitution by traffickers in Albania,” then “women in danger of 
being trafficked as prostitutes”) “shorthand for describing women 
vulnerable to trafficking.”123 This formulation conformed to the court’s 
observation that an immutable or fundamental characteristic forming a 
cognizable social group can include “membership in a group whose 
ideas or practices run counter to the cultural or social convention of 
the country.”124   
The court found that contrary to the BIA and panel’s opinions, 
Cece’s social group was not defined solely by the harm inflicted, as 
the social group of young women living alone in Albania existed 
independently of the traffickers.
125
 The group members shared the 
immutable or fundamental characteristics of being: (1) young, (2) 
female, and (3) living alone.
126
 For support, the court cited precedent 
for the assertion that a purported social group may still be cognizable 
even if partly defined by the persecution; it just cannot be defined 
solely by the persecution.
127
 The court derived its conclusion from the 
                                                                                                                   
Judge Manion argued the BIA should be afforded the first opportunity to determine 
whether the characteristics of “young” and “living alone” could form a cognizable 
social group. Id. at 685 (Manion, J. dissenting).
  
        
   
121 
Id. at 670 (majority opinion). 
     
122 
Id.
   
123 
Id. at 671.
   
124 
Id. at 669.
 
125 
Id. at 677. 
126 
Id. at 672. 
127 
Id. at 676.
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reasoning in mixed motive cases.
128
 Courts look beyond persecution at 
the underlying characteristics accounting for fear and vulnerability.
129
  
Next, the court addressed the slippery slope argument of the 
dissenters – that defining broad categories of social group 
cognizability will lead to asylum eligibility for everyone facing a 
safety risk in her home country notwithstanding the reason.
130
 By 
example, the court stated that just because all women and African 
Americans are protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does 
not mean all members of the protected class have a discrimination 
claim.
131
 Besides establishing a cognizable social group, the asylum 
applicant must prove a nexus – that she will be persecuted on account 
of the membership in a particular social group.
132
 Thus, even if the 
number of members of a cognizable social group were many, fewer 
members can establish all statutory asylum eligibility requirements.
133
 
The court listed examples where cognizable social groups had many 
members.
134
  
To overcome Chevron
135
 deference, the court stated the BIA 
decision was inconsistent with its similar decisions.
136
 Accordingly, 
the BIA erred by concluding a young woman living alone cannot 
                                                 
128 
Id. at 672. See supra text accompanying note 48.   
129 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 672.
   
130 
Id. at 673-74.
   
131 
Id.
   
132 
Id.
 
133 
Id. at 674-75. 
134 
Id.
  
135 
The BIA's reasonable interpretations of ambiguous terms of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act are entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).; see INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999); Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 542 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (“Precedential opinions of the [BIA] interpreting the governing legal 
standards, or non-precedential decisions of the [BIA] that rely on applicable [BIA] 
precedent, are entitled to Chevron deference.”). Congress did not define “social 
group,” so the BIA’s interpretation of the term guides courts. Cece II, 733 F.3d at 
669. 
136 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 676.
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constitute a social group.
137
 For example, in Matter of Kasinga, the 
BIA found a cognizable social group of young women of a tribe 
practicing female genital mutilation.
138
 The court did not find that case 
distinguishable from Cece’s case because both cases involved a broad 
group “narrowed by other changeable but fundamental 
characteristics.”139 That narrowing characteristic in Cece’s case is 
living alone, rather than experiencing female genital mutilation as in 
Matter of Kasinga.
140
 The court did not decide whether gender alone 
could form a cognizable social group.
141
 But, the court held that 
“gender plus one or more narrowing characteristics” could form a 
cognizable social group.
142
 
After concluding that Cece proffered a cognizable social group, 
the court found the BIA’s conclusion that internal relocation was 
reasonable was not supported by substantial evidence.
143
 Actually, the 
BIA’s decision was not supported by any evidence or analysis and the 
only discussion on the issue was the immigration judge’s disagreement 
with the BIA’s conclusion.144 Instead, the facts supported the 
conclusion that internal relocation was unreasonable: (1) Cece lived 
safely in Tirana because she lived with her sister; (2) given the small 
size of Albania, it would be difficult to hide; (3) throughout Albania, 
the norm is for people to live in family or clan groupings; and (4) Cece 
was already known to traffickers, and thus at an increased risk of 
                                                 
137 
Id. at 677.
 
138 
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996).
 
139 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 676. 
140 
Id.
 
141 
Id.
 
142 
Id.
 
143 
Id. at 677-78. The court defers to the BIA’s factual findings unless the 
record lacks substantial evidence to support the factual findings. Malek v. INS, 198 
F.3d 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2000). The standard for substantial evidence is whether the 
BIA’s determination “is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence 
on the record considered as a whole.” Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
144 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 677-78.
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being targeted.
145
 The court granted Cece’s petition for review and 
remanded her case.
146
 
 
2. Dissenting Opinions 
 
Judge Easterbrook’s dissent addressed the fallacies of the court’s 
acceptance of Cece’s social group, namely, that anyone facing a risk of 
harm in her home country could point to an alleged immutable 
characteristic and establish asylum eligibility, no matter the reason for 
the risk of harm.
147
 In effect, this would skip the issue of establishing a 
protected ground and go straight to the issue of whether persecution 
occurred, thus not giving effect to all the statutory requirements.
148
 
Judge Easterbrook appeared to question whether Cece had a well-
founded fear of persecution.
149
 He noted that (1) the number of 
Albanian prostitutes is not indicative of how many are in the sex trade 
involuntarily; (2) presumably, the number of young women living 
alone is Albania is substantially higher than the statistics of Albanian 
trafficking victims; (3) the State Department ranks numerous other 
countries as having a greater sex trafficking risk than Albania; and (4) 
“[d]eplorable as human trafficking is, any given woman’s danger in 
Albania may be modest.”150 Judge Easterbrook contended the BIA had 
substantial evidence to conclude internal relocation was reasonable 
because Cece was not followed or confronted when she moved to 
Tirana.
151
 Further, Judge Easterbrook doubted Cece’s eligibility for 
asylum because of the adverse factor of entering the U.S. by fraud 
absent imminent danger.
152
 
                                                 
145 
Id.
   
146 
Id. at 678.
   
147 
Id. at 678-83 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
   
148 
Id. at 680. 
149 
See id. at 678-79. 
150 
Id.  
151 
Id. at 679-80.    
152 
Id. at 683. 
22
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Like Judge Easterbrook, Judge Manion disagreed with the social 
group formulation, stating that characteristics like “young” and “living 
alone” are not immutable or fundamental characteristics.153 A 
characteristic based on age is subjective and subject to manipulation 
for the purpose of social group formulation, as shown by Cece’s 
expert, who offered a target age group of approximately age 16 to age 
27.
154
 Judge Manion argued the majority erred by considering whether 
“young” and “living alone” could be social group characteristics 
because the BIA did not consider these characteristics and thus the 
court lacked authority to do so, making remand the proper action.
155
 
Regardless, human trafficking is a risk facing all Albanians – men, 
women, and children.
156
 Finally, Judge Manion argued the majority 
erred by stating the BIA did not support its decision that internal 
relocation was reasonable with substantial evidence because the BIA 
analyzed the facts and declared internal relocation was feasible in its 
first opinion.
157
  
 
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
Cece v. Holder conflicts with the Sixth Circuit decision Rreshpja 
v. Gonzales, which held that young and attractive Albanian women 
forced into prostitution were not a cognizable social group.
158
 Like 
Cece, Rreshpja feared returning to Albania because she was at risk for 
forced prostitution.
159
 While living with her aunt in Tirana, Rreshpja 
escaped from a man trying to abduct her.
160
 As she escaped, the man 
                                                 
153 
Id. at 684 (Manion, J. dissenting).
   
154 
Id. at 685. In his dissent, Judge Easterbrook contemplated that “[p]erhaps 
Cece looks younger than her age and would be targeted by mistake, but [Cece] does 
not argue this.” Cece II, 733 F.3d at 678 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting). 
155 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 685 (Manion, J. dissenting).   
156 
Id. at 685-86.
  
157 
Id. at 687.  
158 
Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005).   
159 
Id. at 554-55. 
160 
Id. at 553.
   
23
Coutu: Gender Plus One: Broadening Judicial Interpretation of Gender-Bas
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2013
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 9, Issue 1                               Fall 2013 
 
173 
 
asserted “she should not get too excited because she would end up on 
her back in Italy, like many other girls.”161 Perceiving this as a threat 
of forced prostitution, Rreshpja and her aunt reported the incident to 
the police, who said there was insufficient information to identify or 
arrest the man.
162
 Rreshpja entered the U.S. on a nonimmigrant visa 
which was issued based on fraudulent documents.
163
  
The court based its conclusion that young and attractive Albanian 
women forced into prostitution did not constitute a cognizable social 
group on two reasons.
164
 First, the proposed group was a too 
generalized and sweeping classification, particularly considering 
Rreshpja did not demonstrate there was a pervasive practice of forcing 
young women into prostitution.
165
 Second, the social group was 
circularly defined by its persecution, as group members did not share a 
narrowing characteristic besides the risk of persecution.
166
 Besides not 
establishing a cognizable social group, Rreshpja faced asylum 
eligibility problems because (1) she did not prove past persecution nor 
did she prove an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution, and 
(2) the immigration judge found some of her testimony lacked 
credibility.
167
 Therefore, Rreshpja was denied asylum.
168
 
Cece’s majority rejected the Rreshpja court’s reasoning that the 
purported social group of “young-looking, attractive Albanian women 
who are forced into prostitution” was too broad and sweeping a 
classification.
169
 The Cece court noted that many social groups 
recognized by the BIA and other circuits included broad 
characteristics; regardless, a potentially large pool of valid asylum 
                                                 
161 
Id.
 
162 
Id.
   
163 
Id. at 553-54.
    
164 
Id. at 555.
     
165 
Id. at 555-56.
   
166 
Id. at 556.
     
167 
Id.
   
168 
Id. at 556-57. Rreshpja’s applications for withholding of removal and 
protection under the Convention against Torture were also denied. Id. at 557.
   
169 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 675 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).    
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claims is not a basis for rejecting an otherwise cognizable social 
group.
170
 To illustrate, Judge Rovner pointed out that the large number 
of ethnic Tutsis in Rwanda (almost 700,000) before they were targeted 
for genocide, and six million Jews in Nazi-controlled Europe would 
have had valid asylum claims today despite the large size of the 
groups.
171
  
Further, while the social group formulations of Cece and Rreshpja 
alluded to the persecution suffered by the female group members – 
being targeted for prostitution – the group members were not united 
solely by persecution they suffer.
172
 Therefore, the Cece majority 
rejected the Rreshpja court’s conclusion that “young (or those who 
appear to be young), attractive Albanian women . . . forced into 
prostitution” were not a cognizable group because the group was 
circularly defined by the persecution suffered.
173
 Judge Easterbrook’s 
dissent referenced the conflicting Rreshpja decision to contend that 
Cece’s case was a poor choice to set aside the approach of the BIA and 
sister circuits.
174
 
While the majority acknowledged another potentially conflicting 
decision only in a footnote,
175
 Judge Easterbook emphasized the 
Second Circuit decision, Gjura v. Holder, in his dissent.
176
 Like Cece, 
Gjura entered the U.S. with a fraudulent Italian passport under the Visa 
Waiver Program.
177
 Gjura feared returning to Albania because she 
claimed the Albanian mafia tried to kidnap and force her into 
prostitution twice, and her sister and cousin were kidnapped and 
murdered.
178
 Besides finding that Gjura did not establish a nexus 
                                                 
170 
Id. at 673-74.
   
171 
Id. at 674.
   
172 
Id. 
173 
Id. at 672. 
174 
Id. at 682-83 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).  
175 
Id. at 672 n.5 (majority opinion).
 
176 
Id. at 683.
 
177 
Gjura v. Holder, 695 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam), withdrawn 
and superseded by, 502 Fed. App’x. 91 (2d Cir. 2012). 
178 
Id.
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between social group membership and her attacks or that the Albanian 
government was unable or unwilling to protect her, the Second Circuit 
analyzed her social group formulation.
179
 Its initial opinion held that 
young, unmarried Albanian women were not a cognizable social 
group.
180
 The court followed the reasoning of the Rreshpja court – the 
purported social group formulation was too generalized and sweeping 
and the group was circularly defined by its persecution.
181
 
Gjura v. Holder was decided after the Cece panel opinion but 
before the panel opinion was vacated. While the Second Circuit agreed 
with the Sixth Circuit’s social group reasoning in Rreshpja, the Second 
Circuit stated: “Gjura’s proposed social group differs from, and is more 
amporphous [sic] than the social group defined in Cece [sic] v. 
Holder.”182 Further, Gjura’s replacement opinion, decided after Cece’s 
panel opinion was vacated and before the en banc decision, declined to 
address whether young, unmarried Albanian women were a cognizable 
social group.
183
 Judge Easterbrook noted
184
 that Gjura was denied 
asylum mainly because the criminal conduct of a private actor does 
not demonstrate that the Albanian government was unable or unwilling 
to prevent persecution.
185
 
Cece v. Holder, Rreshpja v. Gonzales, and Gjura v. Holder were 
not the only occasions where the Seventh Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and 
Second Circuit, respectively, considered an Albanian woman’s risk of 
forced prostitution as part of a social group formulation for asylum 
relief. Since Rreshpja, the Sixth Circuit has twice relied on its 
reasoning in that case to not find social group cognizability of 
                                                 
179 
Id. at 226-27.
 
180 
Id. at 226.
 
181 
Id.
 
182 
Id. n.1. (emphasis added).
 
183 
Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 2356 (2013); see Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 672 n.5 (7th. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“The 
Second Circuit . . . skirted the issue of whether ‘young, unmarried Albanian women 
could constitute a social group’ and found instead that the applicant, Gjura, had 
failed to establish a nexus.”). 
184 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 683 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
    
185 
Gjura, 502 Fed. App’x. at 92.
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Albanian women fearing forced prostitution.
186
 The Second Circuit 
was previously confronted with the issue addressed in Gjura v. Holder, 
but each time the court declined to determine the cognizability of the 
purported social group of the asylum applicants.
187
 Before the Cece 
decision, the Seventh Circuit held that “young women in Albania 
without male protection” from gang sex trafficking recruitment were 
not cognizable because while a social group may be defined partly by 
gender, the applicant’s social group formulation was defined largely by 
the crime problem in Albania.
188
  
Additionally, the Third Circuit faced a similar issue and rejected 
the purported social group of “young women who have been 
approached or threatened with kidnapping, forced prostitution or 
killing by human traffickers that the government of Albania either 
cannot or will not control,” finding the social group did not exist 
absent persecution.
189
 
While Judge Easterbrook criticized the majority’s decision as 
being inconsistent with Gjura v. Holder,
190
 the Second Circuit might 
                                                 
186 
Kalaj v. Holder, 319 Fed. App’x. 374, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding 
“young, impoverished, single, uneducated women who risk kidnapping and forced 
prostitution” were not a cognizable social group”); Papapano v. Gonzales, 188 Fed. 
App’x. 447, 453-54 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding “women likely to be kidnapped or 
forced into prostitution” were not a cognizable social group).
 
187 
Lushaj v. Holder, 380 Fed. App’x. 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to 
consider whether “young women in Albania” or “women who were previously 
targeted for sex-trafficking by members of the Haklaj gang and who managed to 
escape and avoid capture” formed a cognizable social group); Celaj v. Gonzales, 186 
Fed. App’x. 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 2006) (remanding to the BIA the issue of whether 
“young Albanian women who fear being sold into prostitution” formed a cognizable 
social group); Nilaj v. Gonzales, 205 Fed. App’x. 902, 903-04 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(remanding to the BIA the issue of whether young Albanian women at risk for 
abduction and forced prostitution formed a cognizable social group).   
188 
Lleshanaku v. Ashcroft, 100 Fed. App’x. 546, 549-50 (7th Cir. 2004).
   
189 
Kuci v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 299 Fed. App’x. 168, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2008).  In an 
earlier case, the Third Circuit remanded the issue of whether “women who are 
potential victims of sex trade” constituted a cognizable social group. Muca v. 
Ashcroft, 116 Fed. App’x. 400, 402-03 (3d Cir. 2004). 
190 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 682-82 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J. 
dissenting).
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have concluded Cece was a member of a cognizable social group.  
First, the initial opinion of Gjura stated “Gjura’s proposed social group 
differs from, and is more amporphous [sic] than the social group 
defined in Cece [sic] v. Holder.”191 As Gjura was decided before 
Cece’s panel opinion was vacated, the Gjura court cited Judge 
Rovner’s dissenting opinion approvingly, where Judge Rovner noted 
the expert’s testimony that “the group of threatened women in Albania 
is composed of women who are between the ages of sixteen and 
twenty-six (perhaps twenty-seven) who live alone.”192 This means the 
Second Circuit believed Cece’s purported social group was not as 
amorphous as Gjura’s, hence it was more likely to constitute a 
cognizable social group. 
 A potential problem with Gjura’s social group formulation is that 
the broad and amorphous term of “young” was not defined.193 Cece’s 
purported social group defined young as age sixteen to age twenty six 
or twenty seven.
194
 The replacement Gjura opinion declined to address 
whether young, unmarried Albanian women were a cognizable social 
group “because Gjura failed to establish a nexus between her attacks 
and her membership in a particular social group” and failed to show 
that the government was unable or unwilling to protect her from 
persecutors.
195
 If the Second Circuit decided the cognizability of 
Cece’s purported social group, the court may have likewise concluded 
Cece formed a cognizable social group.   
The Sixth Circuit’s Rreshpja v. Gonzalez decision is contrary to 
Cece v. Holder in that the purported social groups are similar, but 
Rreshpja’s purported social group of young (or perceived to be 
young), attractive, Albanian women at risk of forced prostitution was 
                                                 
191 
Gjura v. Holder, 695 F.3d 223, 226 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) 
(emphasis added), withdrawn and superseded by, 502 Fed. App’x. 91 (2d Cir. 2012).  
192 
Id.
  
193 
Id. at 226-27.
 
194 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (majority opinion). Dr. Fischer, however, testified 
that while that is the targeted age group, there are numerous instances of kidnapping 
and trafficking outside of that age group. Id. at 673.
  
195 
Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 2356 (2013).
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not cognizable,
196
 and Cece’s purported social group of young, 
Albanian women living alone was cognizable.
197
 The two purported 
social groups are factually distinguishable, however.  First, Rreshpja 
did not define young, which could have alleviated the concern that the 
purported social group was broadly defined and too generalized.
198
 
Cece’s expert, on the other hand, defined young as between the ages of 
sixteen and approximately twenty seven.
199
 Second, Rreshpja included 
the potential persecution – forced prostitution – in the social group 
formulation.
200
 Cece did not include the potential persecution in her 
purported social group, but included the characteristic of living 
alone.
201
 Living alone was a significant factor of her vulnerability to 
persecution, specifically, sex trafficking.
202
 As such, Cece’s social 
group existed independent of the persecution,
203
 whereas Rresphja’s 
social group was considered “circularly defined by the fact that it 
suffers persecution.”204 Even if the Sixth Circuit had reached a 
contrary decision on the exact same social group formulation as Cece, 
the Seventh Circuit’s acknowledgment of gender plus one or more 
narrowing characteristics as a legitimate method to form a social 
group
205
 adequately addresses the concern that a social group based on 
gender would be overly broad.   
 
V. USE OF THE GENDER PLUS ONE FORMULATION 
 
The predominant reason the BIA and circuits are reluctant to 
accept a social group defined by gender alone is the concern that too 
                                                 
196 
Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005).
 
197 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 674-78. 
198 
Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556.
 
199 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667. 
200 
Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556.
 
201 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 67-71. 
202 
Id. at 677-78.
   
203 
Id. 
204 
Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 556. 
205 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 676. 
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many individuals would belong to a social group, and consequently 
too many individuals would be asylum eligible.
206
 A social group 
should be narrowly defined, and it may be found overbroad if it 
encompasses much of the home country.
207
 Other elements besides 
establishing membership in a particular social group, or alternatively, 
one of the other four protected grounds, are required to establish 
asylum eligibility. These elements include establishing (1) past 
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and (2) a 
nexus between the protected ground and persecution.
208
 Also, the 
applicant must be credible.
209
 
Given the high burden of establishing all asylum eligibility 
requirements, a broader interpretation of gender-based social groups 
would not lead to an influx of asylees.
210
 Regardless, courts are 
inclined to bypass the complex issue of social group cognizability
211
 or 
presume social group membership and deny the asylum claim on other 
grounds.
212
 Therefore, the social group formulation of gender plus one 
would hardly increase the number of aliens granted asylum, if increase 
it at all.
213
 Other circuits used the gender plus one formulation.
214
 The 
                                                 
206 
See id. at 680 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting) (expressing the concern that the 
Seventh Circuit has created precedent that everyone qualifies for social group 
membership, rendering statutory asylum eligibility requirements meaningless).   
207 
See, e.g., Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2005). 
208 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). 
209 
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
   
210 
Randall, supra note 14, at 299. 
211 
See, e.g., Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. 91, 92 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2356 (2013). 
212 
See, e.g., Urbina-Dore v. Holder, 735 F.3d 952, 953 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(discussing the pointlessness of the applicants arguing social group membership on 
appeal because the BIA assumed they belonged to a cognizable social group and 
denied asylum on other grounds).   
213 
See Protecting Victims, supra note 13, at 132-33 (discussing the lack of an 
appreciable increase in claims based on female genital mutilation after Matter of 
Kasinga); see also Chan, supra note 17, at 177 (“Although women and children 
constituted the majority of [European refugee asylum-seekers post World War II], 
women often faced significant difficulty leaving their countries of origin due to a 
lack of financial means and other resources.”).
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formulation alleviates the concern that gender may comprise too large 
a group by narrowing the group with one or more additional 
characteristics besides gender.   
The following cases consist solely of cognizable social group 
formulations of gender plus one or more narrowing characteristics. 
They are not exhaustive of all the asylum cases discussing gender in 
defining a social group. Numerous decisions rejected a social group 
formulated in part or in whole by gender.
215
 Moreover, the BIA or 
circuits may have bypassed the issue of whether a purported social 
group based in whole or in part on gender was cognizable if another 
issue was conclusive against the applicant.
216
 Further, even if there 
were a finding of a cognizable social group, it does not mean the 
applicant was granted asylum, considering all of the other asylum 
eligibility requirements that must be met.
217
   
 
A. Gender Plus Transgression of Social, Cultural, or Religious 
Norms 
 
A social group united by “ideas or practices [that] run counter to 
the cultural or social convention of [their home] country . . . might 
seem plausibly alterable;” however, individuals have the right to retain 
characteristics fundamental to their individual identity.
218
 For example, 
women who oppose suppressing “their core, fundamental values or 
beliefs” may form a cognizable social group.219 In Fatin v. INS, the 
                                                                                                                   
214 
E.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993). 
215 
E.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991).
 
216 
E.g., Gjura v. Holder, 502 Fed. App’x. at 92. “As a general rule courts and 
agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is 
unnecessary to the results they reach.” Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976).
   
217 
E.g., Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241-42 (holding that while the gender plus social 
group was cognizable, the applicant did not demonstrate she was a member of that 
group, and thus, she could not establish persecution).   
218 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
219 
Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 996 (6th Cir. 2009), reh’g denied, 
594 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2010).   
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Third Circuit recognized that Iranian women who refused to conform 
to the gender-specific laws and social norms of Iran formed a 
cognizable social group.
220
 Parastoo Fatin (“Fatin”) left Iran to be 
educated in the United States.
221
 Before entering the U.S., Fatin 
participated in a political group and a women’s rights group.222 Fatin 
opposed the Islamic dress code, and as a feminist, opposed gender 
laws constraining women.
223
  
Recognizing that the Acosta definition “specifically mentioned 
‘sex’ as an innate characteristic that could link the members of ‘a 
particular social group,’” the court stated that a social group based 
solely on gender could form a cognizable social group.
224
 Nonetheless, 
the court accepted the cognizability of Fatin’s more narrowly defined 
social group formulation: women refusing to conform to gender-
specific laws and social norms.
225
 Opposition to gender specific laws 
can be so fundamental to a woman’s identity that she should not be 
required to change.
226
 Complying with the Islamic dress code may be 
so abhorrent to some women that it would constitute persecution; 
however, that does not mean it would constitute persecution for all 
women.
227
  
In the Seventh Circuit decision Sarhan v. Holder, Sara Issa 
Mohamad Disi (“Disi”) feared persecution due to a cultural practice.228 
Disi’s sister-in-law spread a rumor in Disi’s home country of Jordan 
that Disi had committed adultery.
229
 At the time, Disi was in the U.S. 
                                                 
220 
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1241. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Yadegar-Sargis v. 
INS held that Christian women in Iran who opposed adhering to the Islamic female 
dress code were a cognizable social group. Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 
603 (7th Cir. 2002).
   
221 
Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1235.
 
222 
Id. at 1236.
 
223 
Id. 
224 
Id. at 1240. 
225 
Id. at 1241.
 
226 
Id.
 
227 
Id. at 1242.
  
228 
Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2011).  
229 
Id. at 651.
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on a visitor visa with her family.
230
 The rumor spread to Disi’s 
family.
231
 Disi’s brother believed the rumor, and Disi was informed 
that her brother planned to kill her as an honor killing.
232
 Honor 
killings are common, usually occurring “in countries where the moral 
code tightly restricts women; government offers little protection for 
the victims; and killers receive light punishment, if charges are not 
dropped altogether.”233 Typically, the victim of an honor killing is a 
female whose male relative kills the female to cleanse the family of 
the reputational harm caused by the female’s immoral behavior.234 
When Disi’s brother visited her in the U.S., he informed Disi that 
he would murder her when she returned to Jordan.
235
 The court found 
that Disi was a member of the cognizable social group of Jordanian 
women accused of being immoral criminals due to their transgression 
of social and religious norms.
236
 Its holding rejected the BIA’s 
assertion that the members of Disi’s purported social group are only 
united by the shared experience of being targets for honor killings.
237
 
Jordanian society treats women who violate the moral code as outcasts 
and permits honor killings of those women by family members.
238
 
Moreover, women at risk of honor killings are unable “to shed the 
stigmatizing characteristics that render them victims.”239  The court 
noted the global plight of women by stating that “[a]long with female 
genital mutilation, human trafficking and slavery, spousal rape, and 
domestic battery [the practice of honor killing] is among the most 
severe abuses that women face.”240 
                                                 
230 
Id.
 
231 
Id.
 
232 
Id.
 
233 
Id. 
234 
Id. (citation omitted).
 
235 
Id. at 652. 
236 
Id. at 654-55. 
237 
Id. at 655. 
238 
Id.
 
239 
Id.
 
240 
Id. at 662-63.
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Like Fatin and Sarhan, Cece transgressed social and cultural 
norms by living alone in Albania. Much of Cece’s testimony before the 
immigration judge focused on her status of living alone in Albania.
241
 
Cece testified that women in Albania do not live alone, she did not 
know anyone living alone, she feared living alone, and she was 
targeted because she was living alone.
242
 Dr. Fischer’s testimony 
stressed the risk facing women living alone in Albania.
243
 Women who 
lack protection from husbands and other family members become 
particularly vulnerable to traffickers in Albania.
244
 Analogous to 
Sarhan’s transgression of social norms placing her at risk of an honor 
killing,
245
 Cece’s stigmatizing characteristic of living alone rendered 
her at a significantly higher risk of forced prostitution than the overall 
population, especially because she was already targeted by a gang 
leader.
246
  
The court stated that Cece’s living situation was not alterable.247 
Living alone ran counter to the social and cultural norms of Albania. 
Even though the characteristic of living alone is plausibly alterable, 
the court considered it a fundamental trait to one’s identity such that 
she should not be required to change.
248
  
 
B. Gender Plus Ethnicity, Nationality, or Tribal Membership 
 
The plight of women facing female genital mutilation in their 
home countries has led many courts to conclude that gender plus 
ethnicity, nationality, or tribal membership constitutes a cognizable 
                                                 
241 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
242 
Id.
 
243 
Id.
 
244 
Id.
 
245 
Sarhan, 658 F.3d at 655.
 
246 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667, 670-71.
 
247 
Id. at 673.
   
248 
Id. at 669.
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social group.
249
 The landmark BIA decision involving female genital 
mutilation is Matter of Kasinga.
250
 The applicant was a young member 
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe in Togo,
251
 where it is the normal 
practice of young tribal members to undergo female genital 
mutilation.
252
 While Kasinga’s father was alive, Kasinga was protected 
from female genital mutilation.
253
 After her father’s death, the tribal 
custom was for her paternal aunt to become the family’s primary 
authority figure.
254
 Kasinga’s aunt forced her into a polygamous 
marriage with an older man, and her aunt and new husband planned to 
submit Kasinga to genital mutilation.
255
 She escaped Togo.
256
   
The BIA held that Kasinga belonged to the cognizable social 
group of “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have 
not had [genital mutilation], as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose 
the practice.”257 Two characteristics of the social group formulation 
were immutable: (1) being a young woman, and (2) being a member of 
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe.
258
 Further, having intact genitalia is a 
characteristic that “is so fundamental to the individual identity of a 
young woman that she should not be required to change it.”259 At 
length, the BIA discussed the pervasive problem of the practice of 
                                                 
249 
See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 112-13 (2d Cir. 2008), amended by, Bah 
v. Mukasey, 291 Fed. App’x. 26 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 
1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005). 
250 
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
 
251 
Id. at 358.
 
252 
Id.
 
253 
Id.
 
254 
Id.
 
255 
Id.
 
256 
Id. at 358-59.
 
257 
Id. at 365.
 
258 
Id. at 366. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit held in Niang v. Gonzales that 
female members of the Tukulor Fulani tribe in Senegal constituted a cognizable 
social group because of the immutable characteristics of gender and tribal 
membership. Niang v. Gonzales 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005).
 
259 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 366.
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female genital mutilation in Africa, specifically in Togo, in that it is a 
grave harm inflicted upon females who lack governmental protection 
because the government is complicit in the practice.
260
 While Kasinga 
was a breakthrough decision in gender-based asylum claims in that it 
explicitly recognized gender as a component of a cognizable social 
group, the BIA reached its decision through a restrictive analytical 
route.
261
 Recognizing that genital mutilation is gender-based 
persecution would have established precedent that gender alone can 
form a social group, but instead, the BIA defined Kasinga’s social 
group as gender plus tribal membership and opposition to female 
genital mutilation.
262
 
In the Ninth Circuit’s Mohammed v. Gonzales, Khadija Ahmed 
Mohammed (“Mohammed”) was a member of the Benadiri clan of 
Somalia.
263
 If removed to Somalia, Mohammed feared she would fall 
victim to female genital mutilation.
264
 The court found that 
Mohammed belonged to two cognizable social groups: (1) young girls 
in the Benadiri clan and (2) Somali females.
265
 Somali females, a 
group based on gender alone, was found cognizable due to the deeply 
imbedded cultural practice of female genital mutilation in Somalia, 
where approximately 98% of women underwent female genital 
mutilation.
266
 Despite not having recognized women as a social group 
previously, the court stated “the recognition that girls or women of a 
particular clan or nationality (or even in some circumstances females 
in general) may constitute a social group is simply a logical 
application of our law."
267
 Moreover, the court noted that “[f]ew would 
                                                 
260 
Id. at 366-68. 
 
261 
Randall, supra note 14, at 295.
 
262 
Id.
 
263 
Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2005).
   
264 
Id. 
 
265 
Id. at 796-97.
 
266 
Id. at 797.; In Hassan v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit also concluded Somali 
females constituted a cognizable social group given the prevalence of female genital 
mutilation. Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007).
 
267 
Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797.
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argue that sex or gender, combined with clan membership or 
nationality, is not an ‘innate characteristic,’ ‘fundamental to individual 
identity.’”268 The risk of harm Mohammed faced, female genital 
mutilation, occurs because the person is female and is subjected to 
others’ efforts to exert control over women’s sexuality.269  
Successful asylum claims in female genital mutilation cases 
demonstrate how courts may manipulate the social group definition to 
accommodate a claim based essentially on gender alone.
270
 For 
example, both Kasinga
271
 and Mohammed
272
 used the term “young” in 
a cognizable social group, yet numerous decision makers find the term 
too amorphous.
273
 Gender alone could have been a cognizable social 
group in Kasinga; instead, the BIA narrowed the breadth of a gender 
only social group with the characteristics of tribal membership and 
opposition to the practice of female genital mutilation.
274
 Numerous 
forms of persecution are gender specific.
275
 Sexual violence, like 
forced prostitution in Cece, disproportionately affects women.
276
 
Decision makers tend to attribute gender-based persecution to the 
backward religious, tribal, or societal customs that foster persecution 
of women rather than the problem of violence against women in 
                                                 
268 
Id.
 
269 
Id. at 798 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 
270 
Chan, supra note 17, at 180.
 
271 
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366 (B.I.A. 1996).
 
272 
Mohammed, 400 F.3d at 797.
   
273 
See, e.g., Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that 
“[p]ossession of a broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender will not by 
itself endow individuals with membership in a particular social group.”).
 
274 
Randall, supra note 14, at 295.
 
275 
Id. at 285-86 (listing forms of persecution that are gender specific, 
including sexual violence, genital mutilation, “dowry deaths, purdah, coerced or 
forced adherence to religious dress codes and other specific customs, and the use of 
mass rapes as a weapon of war”).
   
276 
Deborah Anker, Refugee Status and Violence Against Women in the 
“Domestic” Sphere: The Non-State Actor Question, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 391 
(2001).
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general.
277
 The persecution women face is often related to cultural or 
religious practices, so those opposing gender-based asylum presume 
harms facing women are not that serious.
278
 But, the harms facing 
women in gender-based asylum cases are human rights violations that 
are not minor or trivial.
279
 
The tendency of decision makers to distinguish non-Western 
harms from Western harms is evident in Judge Easterbrook’s 
dissenting opinion in Cece.
280
 Judge Easterbrook considered forced 
prostitution a criminal act, not persecution, and declared “[p]eople are 
forced into prostitution in Chicago.”281 Also, he questioned whether 
Cece was at a high risk of persecution.
282
 Regardless, the discussion 
regarding the risk of forced prostitution pertains to establishing 
persecution, not a social group.  
 
C. Gender Plus Relationship Status 
 
In Qu v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit held Bi Xia Qu (“Qu”) was a 
member of the cognizable social group of Chinese women who have 
been subjected to forced marriage and involuntary servitude.
283
 Qu’s 
father took out a loan from Zhang that he was unable to repay.
284
 
Zhang demanded that either the loan be repaid or that Qu become his 
wife.
285
  Zhang also threatened to use his police and gang connections 
to imprison the family if anyone reported the incident.
286
 
                                                 
277 
Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the 
“Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1562, 1584 (2001).
 
278 
Protecting Victims, supra note 13, at 131.
   
279 
Id.
   
280 
See Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 678-79 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J. 
dissenting).
 
281 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 679 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
   
282 
Id. at 678-79.
   
283 
Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 2010).
 
284 
Id. at 604.
 
285 
Id.
 
286 
Id. at 604-05.
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Subsequently, Zhang kidnapped Qu, detained her at his home, 
attempted to rape her, threatened to imprison her if she did not have 
sex with him or repay the debt, and threatened to cut off her hands and 
feet if she tried escaping.
287
 After being detained at his home for about 
two weeks, Qu escaped to her aunt’s house, who helped smuggle Qu 
into the U.S.
288
 Qu feared Zhang would search for her everywhere so 
that he could keep her hostage or sell her and that she was afraid the 
government would harm her if she returned to China.
289
 In holding Qu 
was a member of a cognizable social group, the court concluded the 
members of the social group shared the common, immutable 
characteristic of being a woman abducted by a man for forced 
marriage in an area recognizing forced marriages.
290
 
Another decision with a social group based on gender plus 
relationship status was the Eighth Circuit’s Nwengwe v. Mukasey, 
which held that Cameroonian widows were a cognizable social 
group.
291
 As soon as the husband of Elizabeth Simeni Ngengwe 
(“Ngengwe”) died, her in-laws detained her in their home for two 
months, “shaved her head with a broken bottle, forbade her from 
dressing, kept her children from her, and forced her to sleep on the 
ground” in accordance with traditional mourning rituals.”292 The 
family also took all of the belongings of her and her deceased husband 
and closed their bank account.
293
 Approximately a month after 
escaping with her children to her sister’s home within Cameroon, the 
in-laws arrived at the home demanding Ngengwe marry her brother-
in-law or pay the bride’s price.294 Ngengwe refused to marry the 
brother-in-law because he was older and already had two other wives, 
and Ngengwe informed them she was unable to pay the bride’s 
                                                 
287 
Id. at 605.
 
288 
Id.
 
289 
Id.
 
290 
Id. at 607.
  
291 
Ngengwe v. Mukaskey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1034 (8th Cir. 2008).
   
292 
Id. at 1031.
 
293 
Id. at 1031-32.
 
294 
Id. at 1032.
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price.
295
 Ngengwe’s in-laws beat her, then told her that when they 
returned to her sister’s home in a month, they would kill Ngengwe and 
take her children if she neither married her brother-in-law nor paid the 
bride’s price.296 Ngengwe did not inform the police, believing they 
would not become involved in a family matter.
297
  
The court reasoned that Cameroonian widows shared an 
immutable characteristic – the shared experience of losing a 
husband.
298
 The court rejected the immigration judge’s contention that 
Ngengwe did not have an immutable characteristic because she could 
change her marital status.
299
 Further, the court found that Cameroonian 
widows were a cognizable social group because Cameroonian society 
pervasively discriminates against widows and women are subject to 
mourning rituals.
300
   
The Cece court analogized the characteristic of living alone to 
relationship status.
301
 During Cece’s testimony, the government 
attorney asked Cece why she could not find a man to marry and 
protect her.
302
 The court stated that “this is the type of fundamental 
characteristic change that [is] not ask[ed] of asylum applicants.”303 
This reasoning is analogous to that of the Ngengwe court, which 
rejected the immigration judge’s conclusion that Ngengwe did not 
have an immutable characteristic because she could change her marital 
status.
304
 Living alone is a plausibly alterable, but fundamental 
characteristic.
305
 
 
                                                 
295 
Id.
 
296 
Id.
 
297 
Id.
 
298 
Id. at 1034.
 
299 
Id.
 
300 
Id. at 1034-35.
 
301 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
302 
Id.
 
303 
Id.
  
304 
Ngengwe, 543 F.3d at 1034.
   
305 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 669.
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VI. PROPOSAL FOR GENDER-BASED SOCIAL GROUP 
FORMULATIONS 
 
A. The Logical Fallacies of the Cece Opinion 
 
While the court correctly found Cece’s gender plus social group 
cognizable based on prior case law, the majority’s reasoning consisted 
of convoluted logic. Specifically, the court stated the group members’ 
“age, gender, nationality, [and] living situation are not alterable.”306 
Generally speaking, gender and nationality are unalterable. But, age is 
an inherently changeable characteristic, and one’s living situation 
changes.   
The court did not discuss age beyond explaining that Cece’s 
expert defined a target age group of women at risk of persecution.
307
 
Surely one cannot volitionally alter her age, but age naturally 
progresses. Judge Easterbrook and Judge Manion discussed the 
fallacies of considering a changeable characteristic like age as an 
immutable characteristic.
308
 Like many previous adjudicators, Judge 
Manion criticized using young as a characteristic in a social group 
because it is too amorphous and subjective.
309
 Cece’s expert defined 
young by testifying that females between age sixteen and twenty six 
are primarily targeted for forced prostitution, but others outside the 
age range could also become victims.
310
 Judge Easterbrook opined that 
Cece was not even in the social group because she is now thirty four 
years old.
311
 For that reason, Judge Manion criticized that accepting a 
                                                 
306 
Id. at 673.
   
307 
Id.
    
308 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 680 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting); Cece II, 733 F.3d at 
684-85 (Manion, J. dissenting).
     
309 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 684-85 (Manion, J. dissenting).
 
310 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (majority opinion).
 
311 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 678 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
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social group using the term “young” would make the social group 
formulation malleable.
312
      
The pervasive problem of backlogs in immigration courts affects 
any social group using age as a characteristic.
313
 Asylum applicants 
wait, often years, before they appear for a merits hearing before an 
immigration judge.
314
 An immigration judge did not decide Cece’s 
claim until approximately four years after she applied for asylum.
315
 
This does not account for the subsequent appeals and remands of her 
case. Approximately seven years passed from the date the immigration 
judge first heard her case to the date of the en banc Seventh Circuit 
decision.
316
 Cece was twenty three years old when she entered the 
U.S.
317
 and currently is approximately thirty four years old.
318
 When 
the immigration judge granted her asylum application in 2006, Cece 
was approximately twenty six years old and within the age group 
defined by her expert.
319
 Penalizing an applicant like Cece for aging 
out of her social group creates a perverse incentive to delay 
adjudication of asylum claims and the appellate process. Nevertheless, 
the court emphasized her expert’s testimony that women outside the 
target age group were also at risk of forced prostitution.
320
 
                                                 
312 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 685 (Manion, J. dissenting) (“Is 34 young? It depends 
on whom you ask. And that is the problem with using such subjective characteristics 
to define a ‘social group.’”).
 
313 
See Ashley Huebner, Decision 2015: Chicago Asylum Applicants Waiting 
Three Years to See a Judge, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER (Mar. 13, 
2012), available at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/staff/blog/decision-2015-
chicago-asylum-applicants-waiting-three-years-see-judge.
 
314 
Id.
 
315 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 667 (majority opinion).
 
316 
Id.
 
317 
Cece I, 668 F.3d 510, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d en banc, Cece II, 733 
F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
318 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 678 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
 
319 
Cece II, 733 F. 3d at 667 (majority opinion).
 
320 
Id. at 673.
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Likewise, the court’s finding that one’s living situation is not 
alterable
321
 suffers from logical fallacies. The court explained that 
while it is plausibly alterable, it is a fundamental characteristic.
322
 
Judge Manion believed living alone is not immutable or fundamental 
to one’s identity like relationship status.323 Similarly, Judge 
Easterbrook stated that “[p]eople may marry, live with relatives, or 
join forces with similarly situated persons[, and] [m]any single women 
live with other single women.”324 As such, one’s living situation is 
changeable.
325
 The differing interpretation of adjudicators regarding 
what characteristics are immutable potentially dooms any purported 
gender plus social group.    
 
B. A Proposed Interpretation of Gender-Based Social Group 
Formulations 
 
The BIA decided in Acosta that gender is an immutable 
characteristic that could form a social group.
326
 All circuits follow the 
Acosta test.
327
 As such, applicants should not have to prove the plus 
characteristics are immutable as well. Gender alone should be the 
immutable characteristic defining the social group, and the issue 
should be whether the plus characteristics narrow the group 
                                                 
321 
Id.
 
322 
Id. at 669. Other than Cece continuing to live alone, nothing suggested Cece 
found living alone fundamental to her identity. While the Fatin court found Iranian 
women who refused to conform to gender-specific laws and social norms formed a 
cognizable social group, the court concluded opposition to the gender-specific laws 
was not fundamental to Fatin, and she was not granted asylum. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 
1233, 1241-42 (3d Cir. 1993).
 
323 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 684 (Manion, J. dissenting).
 
324 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 680-81 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
 
325 
Id. at 680.
 
326 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in 
part, on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
 
 
327
 See cases cited supra note 1.
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sufficiently so that group members can establish the nexus between 
group membership and persecution.
328
  
This approach would not bypass the requirement of establishing a 
social group, as Acosta already decided gender is an immutable 
characteristic.
329
 Nor would it bypass the nexus requirement. In Cece, 
the court emphasized the significance of demonstrating a nexus 
between group membership and persecution because the nexus is a 
requirement for asylum eligibility and narrows the breadth of the 
social group.
330
 The nexus cannot be analyzed completely 
independently from the protected ground because identifying the 
relevant protected ground “requires an examination of against whom 
the harm is directed before the persecutor’s motivation for the harm is 
examined.”331 
 
C. Increased Recognition of Gender-Based Social Groups Would 
Not Open the Floodgates 
 
The concern that increased recognition of gender-based social 
groups would result in an influx of asylees is unfounded for numerous 
reasons. First, numerous aliens fearing persecution cannot leave their 
home countries due to a lack of financial resources.
332
 Second, only a 
small percentage of immigrants admitted into the U.S. are asylees, so 
concern regarding the number of immigrants is misplaced.
333
 Third, 
the applicant must still establish the other procedural and evidentiary 
                                                 
328 
See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender constitutes 
a social group (which both certainly do) but on whether the members of that group 
are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted ‘on 
account of’ their membership.”); Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2006), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007) (same). 
329 
Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233.
 
330 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
331 
Casey, supra note 47, at 1006-07 (emphasis in original).
   
332 
Chan, supra note 17, at 188-89.
 
333 
Imbriano, supra note 18, at 351.
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elements to be granted asylum.
334
 The stringent statutory requirements 
already safeguard against potentially innumerable asylum claims.
335
 A 
woman cannot be granted asylum merely because she is a woman 
unless she can establish a nexus between group membership and 
persecution.
336
 Thus, courts should not be concerned everyone would 
qualify for asylum and the narrow refugee definition would be lost if 
gender were a recognized basis for a social group.
337
 Finally, the 
concern of broadening the interpretation of social group formulations 
fails to recognize that other protected grounds, specifically race, 
nationality, and religion, also encompass large populations.
338
 
Regardless, refugee status is determined on a case by case basis and 
should not be affected by the fear of hypothetical asylum claims that 
other women may present in the future.
339
 
 
D. Criticisms of the Gender Plus Formulation and Other 
Proposals 
 
Others have suggested proposals to ameliorate the problem of 
narrow construction of gender-based social group formulations. For 
example, gender could be added as a sixth protected ground in the 
refugee definition.
340
 Congress’s historically slow movement of 
immigration reform
341
 is reason enough to doubt the feasibility of this 
                                                 
334 
Randall, supra note 14, at 299. The social group category “is often seen as a 
gap filler, but it does not soften the requirements for asylum.” Imbriano, supra note 
18, at 345.
 
335 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 673-74.
 
336 
Heitz, supra note 23, at 242.
 
337 
See Imbriano, supra note 18, at 350.
 
338 
Randall, supra note 14, at 299.
 
339 
See id.
 
340 
Chan, supra note 37, at 185.
 
341 
Mary Giovagnoli, Overhauling Immigration Law: A Brief History and 
Basic Principles of Reform, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, available at 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/overhauling-immigration-law-brief-
history-and-basic-principles-reform (discussing the history and issues inhibiting 
immigration reform). Also, gender as a protected ground might be over-inclusive 
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proposal. Moreover, the most significant problem facing gender-based 
asylum claims is the interpretation of the law, not the law itself.
342
 
Another proposal is that courts should recognize gender as the basis of 
persecution, and thus gender alone should form a cognizable group.
343
 
But, some applicants may face difficulty meeting the nexus 
requirement using this approach.
344
  
A criticism of using the gender plus formulation is that the 
applicant must establish gender as well as some other characteristic to 
establish a cognizable social group, thus requiring the applicant to 
“prove twice as much to meet the nexus requirement” compared to 
applicants asserting other protected grounds.
345
 This criticism 
recognizes the problem of the current interpretation of gender plus 
social group formulations. Cece’s majority argued that each plus 
characteristic in Cece’s social group was immutable.346 The dissenters 
disagreed.
347
 If the proposal were accepted that gender alone is the 
immutable characteristic defining the social group so the plus 
characteristics do not need to be immutable as well, then the applicants 
would not have to prove twice as much as applicants asserting other 
protected grounds.  
A related criticism is that the applicant would need to add 
qualifications to narrow the purported social group significantly.
348
 
The female applicant may need to add characteristics to her social 
group formulation if she lacks evidence that the risk of persecution is 
                                                                                                                   
because it could include women facing economic discrimination that cumulatively 
might rise to persecution; Congress did not intend to grant asylum for economic 
persecution. Chan, supra note 37, at 190. 
 
342 
Sinha, supra note 278, at 1565.
 
343 
Randall, supra note 14, at 298.
   
344 
Barbara Barreno, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of Past, Present, 
and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64 VAND. L. REV. 
225, 256 (2011).
   
345 
Chan, supra note 17, at 183.
 
346 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662, 669, 673 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
347 
Cece II, 733. F.3d at 681-82 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting); Cece II, 733 F.3d 
at 684-85 (Manion, J. dissenting).
 
348 
Randall, supra note 14, at 296.
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not based solely on gender.
349
 While some courts have recognized that 
gender alone can form a cognizable social group,
350
 additional 
characteristics may be necessary to establish a nexus. Also, additional 
characteristics may be necessary to meet the particularity 
requirement.
351
 
Presumably considering Acosta, Judge Easterbrook admitted the 
BIA would find Cece is a member of the cognizable social group of 
Albanian women.
352
 He, correctly, pointed out that Cece did not argue 
she would be persecuted based solely on being a woman.
353
 Cece 
needed to add characteristics to her social group formulation to meet 
the nexus requirement. Because no asylum adjudicators contest gender 
is an immutable characteristic, applicants should not be penalized for 
adding characteristics narrowing the breadth of a social group based 
solely on gender so that they can meet the nexus requirement. The 
current interpretation of gender plus social groups requires applicants 
to prove the plus characteristics are immutable too. This disadvantages 
applicants because the applicant must prove at least twice as much as 
applicants who use one of the other protected grounds. Accordingly, a 
better approach is to return to the Acosta view that gender is an 
immutable characteristic
354
 and to not require applicants to prove that 
the additional characteristics are immutable. 
 
                                                 
349 
Barreno, supra note 345, at 257.
   
350 
See, e.g., Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(acknowledging that females might constitute a particular social group in some 
circumstances and that Acosta “listed gender as an example of a prototypical 
immutable characteristic that could form the basis for a social group”).
 
351 
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[T]he key 
question is whether the proposed description is sufficiently particular, or is too 
amorphous to create a benchmark for determining group membership.”) (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
352 
Cece II, 733 F.3d at 681 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
 
353 
Id.
 
354 
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in 
part, on other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
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E. Necessity of Uniform Interpretation of the Law 
 
Asylum officers, immigration judges, and courts have significant 
discretionary power to decide claims, and that discretion contravenes 
the goal of uniform application of the law and the humanitarian 
purpose of asylum.
355
 Social group cognizability turns on arbitrary 
decision making, resulting in a lack of uniformity, including circuit 
splits, and uncertainty for asylum applicants.
356
 A circuit’s decision 
only has precedential effect within the circuit.
357
 Thus, a gender-based 
social group can be cognizable in one jurisdiction, but not another.
358
 
Future asylum applicants like Cece will likely present a cognizable 
social group in the Seventh Circuit, where Cece v. Holder has 
precedential effect, but not in the Sixth Circuit, where Rreshpja v. 
Gonzales has precedential effect.  
The issues presented by arbitrary and discretionary decision 
making of the cognizability of gender-based social group formulations 
were evident in Cece. Besides the circuit split created by the decision, 
the Seventh Circuit was divided on the cognizability of Cece’s social 
group. Of all the possible Seventh Circuit panel combinations, Cece’s 
panel comprised Judge Easterbrook and Judge Manion, who rejected 
Cece’s social group formulation. Judge Rovner dissented. The 
remaining Seventh Circuit judges agreed with Judge Rovner, who 
wrote the en banc opinion finding Cece’s social group cognizable.359 
The fate of an asylum applicant should not turn on luck.
360
  
                                                 
355 
Sinha, supra note 278, at 1571.
  
356 
Chan, supra note 17, at 180, 182.
 
357 
18 JAMES WM MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02(1)(c) 
(3d ed. 2013). While another circuit’s decision is not binding, it is persuasive and 
should be considered “in the interest of maintaining a reasonable uniformity of 
federal law.” Id.  
 
358 
Chan, supra note 17, at 180.
 
359 
Cece II, 733 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
 
360 
See Chan, supra note 17, at 169 (“[T]he fate of the asylum-seeker may . . . 
turn on the arbitrary discretion and decision-making authority of a single judge.”).
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The U.S. Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for immigration 
cases because of the availability of review by the BIA and the 
appropriate circuit.
361
 Consequently, the BIA and circuits establish the 
standards and create the trends of immigration law.
362
 Accepting the 
proposed interpretation that gender alone should be the immutable 
characteristic and the additional characteristics should not have to be 
immutable would create uniformity because there would be no 
subjective interpretation of whether the plus characteristics are 
immutable. The plus characteristics would serve to narrow the social 
group so the nexus requirement can be met. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
Considering case law of the BIA and circuits, the Seventh Circuit 
correctly accepted the cognizability of a social group formulation 
based on gender plus other narrowing characteristics in Cece v. 
Holder. Nevertheless, the court’s reasoning used the same convoluted 
logic of other courts who have found gender plus social groups 
cognizable.
363
 Historically, the narrow construction of gender-based 
groups has left women unable to establish group membership.
364
 The 
current narrow interpretation of gender-based social groups, 
specifically the requirement that the plus characteristics be immutable, 
inhibits the ability to establish group membership and leads to 
arbitrary decision making and circuit splits.
365
 
The gender plus formulation is considered a more limited 
approach rather than recognizing gender alone as a social group 
because it narrows the breadth of gender-based asylum claims.
366
 
                                                 
361 
Imbriano, supra note 18, at 331-32.
 
362 
Heitz, supra note 23, at 239.
 
363 
See Randall, supra note 14, at 294.
 
 
364
 Kounelias, supra note 22, at 597.
   
365 
See Chan, supra note 17, at 180, 182.
 
366 
Susanne J. Prochazka, There is No Honor in Honor Killings:  Why Women 
At Risk for Defying Sociosexual Norms Must Be Considered a “Particular Social 
Group” under Asylum Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 445, 469-70 (2012).
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Given the other stringent requirements for asylum eligibility, broader 
acceptance of gender-based social groups would not dramatically 
increase the number of asylees or grant blanket asylum to women.
367
 
Even if acceptance of gender-based social groups significantly 
increased asylees, only an individual’s claim should be considered.368 
While asylum relief was not intended to protect everyone fleeing 
persecution, those who establish asylum eligibility should not be 
stagnant.
369
 A uniform standard regarding interpretation of gender-
based social group formulations should be created to “provide equal 
protection for women suffering from gender-based persecution.”370 
The Acosta decision showed promise of expanding the social group 
definition to include gender as a cognizable social group.
371
 Returning 
to the Acosta holding that gender is an immutable characteristic 
defining a social group,
372
 the new interpretation that should be 
adopted is that gender alone establishes the requisite immutable 
characteristic for social group membership, and the issue should be 
whether the plus characteristics narrow the group sufficiently so that 
group members can establish the nexus between group membership 
and persecution.
373
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Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled, in part, on 
other grounds, Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
 
373 
See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199–1200 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
focus with respect to such claims should be not on whether either gender constitutes 
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are sufficiently likely to be persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted ‘on 
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